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“ANOTHER DAY” HAS DAWNED: THE MAINE
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT HOLDS LABORATORY
REPORTS SUBJECT TO THE CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE IN STATE V. MANGOS
Reid Hayton-Hull*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause guarantees criminal defendants
the right to “confront witnesses against them.”1 Specifically, the Clause ensures a
criminal defendant’s right to confront witnesses who testify against him by the
unique medium, or “crucible,” of cross-examination.2 Although federal and state
rules of evidence prohibiting hearsay and the Confrontation Clause are designed to
protect similar interests,3 whether or not admission of a piece of evidence violates a
defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause is a separate analysis than
whether that same piece of evidence is admissible under a rule of evidence.4 In
2004, the United States Supreme Court held in Crawford v. Washington that the
Confrontation Clause applies only to “testimonial” statements.5 However, the
Court left “for another day” the creation of a comprehensive definition of
“testimonial.”6 “One of the most difficult issues presented” by Crawford is
whether forensic laboratory reports are “testimonial” for the purposes of the
Confrontation Clause.7 Although forensic laboratory reports are widely admitted at
criminal trials in lieu of live testimony from the technicians who prepared the
reports,8 the Supreme Court of the United States has not yet addressed this issue.
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, however, recently
addressed this issue in State v. Mangos and held that forensic lab reports are
“testimonial.”9 The Supreme Court of the United States is currently reviewing this

* J.D. Candidate, 2010, University of Maine School of Law. The Author would like to thank her
husband, Nathaniel R. Hull, Esq., and her family in Seattle, Chicago, and Maine for their support,
encouragement, and tolerance.
Editor’s Note: This Case Note was written prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Melendez-Diaz, as
explained in Part VII, infra.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
3. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155
(1970)).
4. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
5. Id. at 51.
6. Id. at 68.
7. Craig M. Bradley, Confronting Scientific Tests, 44 TRIAL 56, 56 (2008).
8. For example, “[f]orty-two states and the District of Columbia have statutes allowing the
introduction of forensic [drug] lab reports in lieu of live testimony.” Brief of the States Alabama et al.
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 2, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527
(2009) (No. 07-591) (hereinafter “Brief of the States”).
9. 2008 ME 150, 957 A.2d 89.
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issue in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.10
The Supreme Court should follow the Law Court’s reasoning and hold forensic
laboratory reports to be testimonial. Although forensic laboratory reports were
plainly not within the contemplation of the Founders as they drafted the
Constitution, laboratory reports, which amount to statements made by laboratory
technicians at the behest of law enforcement and in preparation for litigation, are
precisely the type of statements that the Confrontation Clause was designed to
address.11 In light of the weight jurors assign to forensic laboratory evidence12 and
the results of a recent study conducted by the National Academy of Sciences,
which reveals the abysmal state of state forensic laboratories,13 it is imperative that
the Supreme Court follow the Law Court in holding forensic laboratory results to
be testimonial and, therefore, subject to the Confrontation Clause.
II. THE FEDERAL LANDSCAPE
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, made applicable to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment,14 provides that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him.”15 The Confrontation Clause, as envisioned by the
Founders, has its roots in English common law.16 In sixteenth-century England,
under the reign of Queen Mary, Marian statutes “required justices of the peace to
examine suspects and witnesses in felony cases,” and records of such examinations
were sometimes certified by justices of the peace and then “read in court in lieu of
live testimony.”17 The Marian statutes were replaced “[t]hrough a series of
statutory and judicial reforms,” and “the English law developed a right of
confrontation,” 18 which mandated that the defendant have the opportunity to
examine witnesses through the “open” means of cross-examination.19 It was this
common law concept that the members of the first Congress incorporated into the

10. For the purposes of this Note, the category of “forensic laboratory reports” at issue includes,
among other things, both DNA and drug analyses conducted by state forensic laboratories.
11. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52.
12. See Brooke G. Malcom, Convictions Predicated on DNA Evidence Alone: How Reliable
Evidence Became Infallible, 38 CUMB. L. REV. 313, 324-25 (2008).
13. Editorial, Crime Scene Imperfections, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2009, at A20 (finding the field of
forensic science “grossly deficient”).
14. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 62 (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-05 (1965)). See also
Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965) (“We decide today that the Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment is applicable to the States.”).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
16. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43.
17. Id. at 43-44.
18. Id. at 44.
19. Id. at 61-62 (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *373) (“This open examination
of witnesses . . . is much more conducive to the clearing up of the truth.”). See also Mattox v. United
States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895) (The Clause envisions “a personal examination and crossexamination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection
and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in
order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he
gives testimony whether he is worthy of belief.”). Id.
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Sixth Amendment.20
Looking to “interpret the Constitution in the light of the law as it existed at the
time it was adopted,”21 the Supreme Court stated in dicta in Mattox v. United
States, a late nineteenth-century case, that the Confrontation Clause “however
beneficent in [its] operation and valuable to the accused, must occasionally give
way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.”22 In support
of its proposition, the Mattox Court cited the dying declaration exception, which
was “recognized long before the adoption of the Constitution” and which exists “to
prevent a manifest failure of justice.”23
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that, read literally, the
Confrontation Clause “would require, on objection, the exclusion of any statement
made by a declarant not present at trial.”24 However, the Court has also recognized
legitimate “competing interests,” such as public policy and the necessities of the
case, which require a less stringent reading of the Confrontation Clause.25 In Ohio
v. Roberts, the Supreme Court rejected a strict reading of the Clause on the grounds
that such a reading “would abrogate virtually every hearsay exception,” a result
which was “unintended and too extreme.”26 Drawing on several cases in which the
Court “ha[d] sought to accommodate . . . competing interests,”27 the Roberts Court
formulated a framework for analysis of alleged Confrontation Clause violations.
The Roberts Court provided for the admission of a declarant’s prior statements,
where that declarant was unavailable to be cross-examined at trial, if the statements
bore “adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’”28 “Indicia of reliability” can be inferred
principally, though not exclusively, “where the evidence falls within a firmly
rooted hearsay exception.”29 Reasoning that “hearsay rules and the Confrontation
Clause are generally designed to protect similar values,”30 the Roberts Court
concluded that “firmly rooted” hearsay exceptions provided sufficient safeguards
for criminal defendants’ rights under the Confrontation Clause.31
Roberts remained valid precedent, relied upon at both the federal and state
levels,32 for more than twenty years. With the Court’s holding in Crawford v.
Washington, however, the landscape of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence was
20. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 49.
21. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243 (defendant’s right to confront at his second trial was not violated by the
admission of transcripts of deceased witnesses’ testimony from the defendant’s first trial, at which
defendant had cross-examined the witnesses).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 243-44.
24. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63 (citing Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243).
25. Id. at 64 (citing Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243).
26. Id. at 63.
27. Id. at 64 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 171-72 (1970) (Burger, C.J., concurring);
Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243).
28. Id. at 66.
29. Id.
30. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (quoting Green, 399 U.S. at 155).
31. See id. at 66.
32. See, e.g. State v. Morin, 598 A.2d 170, 172 (Me. 1991) (admission of certificate and letter from
the Secretary of State using the public records hearsay exception did not violate the Confrontation
Clause because the public records were “inherently trustworthy”). See also RICHARD H. FIELD & PETER
L. MURRAY, MAINE EVIDENCE 455 (6th ed. 2007).
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altered dramatically. Overruling Roberts, the Supreme Court held in Crawford that
“[t]estimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial [are admissible] only where
the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had prior
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.”33 Writing for the majority, Justice
Scalia focused his opinion on the historic origins of the Confrontation Clause in
order to glean the Framers’ intent in including the Clause in the Sixth Amendment.
Contrary to the Roberts Court’s call for pragmatic compromise,34 the Crawford
Court inferred that, aside from those hearsay exceptions that were acknowledged at
the time of the country’s founding,35 “[w]here testimonial statements are involved,
[the Framers did not mean] to leave the Sixth Amendment’s protection to the
vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to the amorphous notions of
‘reliability.’”36 Drawing on his historical analysis, Justice Scalia determined that
the Clause “reflects an especially acute concern with a specific type of out-of-court
statement,”37 namely testimonial38 “ex parte examinations as evidence against the
accused.”39 Acknowledging that “[v]arious formulations of this core class of
‘testimonial’ statements exists,” the Court limited its holding to “ex parte in-court
testimony or its functional equivalent”40 and to “similar pretrial statements that
declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially.”41 The Crawford
Court “le[ft] for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of
‘testimonial.’”42 As the concurrence predicted, Crawford “cast[] a mantle of
uncertainty over future criminal trials.”43
In Davis v. Washington,44 decided in conjunction with Hammon v. Indiana,45
the Court attempted to define the “perimeter” of the Crawford Court’s formulation
of “testimonial” statements.46 Justice Scalia, again writing for the Court, set out to
“determine when statements made to law enforcement personnel during a 911 call
or at a crime scene are ‘testimonial’ and thus subject to the requirements of the
Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.”47 The Court held that:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation
33. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 60 (citing Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).
35. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6 (noting the exception of dying declarations).
36. Id. at 61. The Court further stated that the Confrontation Clause “is a procedural rather than a
substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a
particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.” Id. at 61.
37. Id. at 51.
38. “‘Testimony’ . . . is typically ‘[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of
establishing or proving some fact.’” Id. (quoting 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)).
39. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.
40. Id. at 51 (emphasis added).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 68. “Whatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a
preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.” Id.
43. Id. at 69 (Rehnquist C.J., concurring).
44. 547 U.S. 813 (2006), aff’d State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005).
45. 547 U.S. 813 (2006), rev’d Hammon v. Indiana, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005). These cases are
known collectively as Davis v. Washington.
46. Davis, 547 U.S. at 823-24.
47. Id. at 817.
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under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They
are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such
ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
48
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.

The Court went on to clarify that, in order to determine what is “testimonial” for
the purposes of the Confrontation Clause, the critical factor is the nature of the
statement, not that of the speaker.49 Distinguishing between the two cases at hand,
the Court determined that, because the victim in Davis placed her 911 call during
the course of an incident of domestic violence,50 the purpose of the victim’s call
was to “describe current circumstances . . . as they were actually happening . . . to
be able to resolve the present emergency.”51 Because the victim’s primary purpose
was to resolve a present emergency, “she simply was not acting as a witness; she
was not testifying.”52 Therefore, her statements to the 911 operator53 were not
testimonial and thus were not subject to the requirements of the Confrontation
Clause.
In contrast to the statements made by the victim in Davis, the statements at
issue in Hammon,54 which were admitted at trial, were made by a victim of
domestic violence after the police, in response to a 911 call, had arrived on the
scene and the incident had ended.55 After responding to the officers’ questions, the
victim filled out and signed an affidavit, which the prosecution successfully
introduced at trial.56 Explaining that statements made in an effort to resolve a
present emergency can “evolve into testimonial statements,”57 the Court
determined that because the emergency was no longer in progress, the victim’s
statements made to officers, recorded in her affidavit, were testimonial.58 Her
statements “under official interrogation [were] an obvious substitute for live
testimony, because they [did] precisely what a witness does on direct

48. Id. at 822.
49. Id. at 821. “Only statements of this sort cause the declarant to be a ‘witness’ within the meaning
of the Confrontation Clause.” Id.
50. In response to concerns cited by Respondents and amici about the susceptibility of domestic
violence victims to intimidation or coercion at the hands of their abusers, and therefore the effect of the
Court’s ruling to exclude testimonial evidence where the victim is likely to be intimidated into not
testifying, the Court “reiterate[ed] what [it] said in Crawford: that ‘the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing .
. . extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds.” Davis, 547 U.S. at 833 (quoting
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62).
51. Davis, 547 U.S. at 827. This is true even of statements regarding the identity of the assailant,
“so that the dispatched officers might know whether they would be encountering a violent felon.” Id.
52. Id. at 828.
53. For the purposes of resolving the issue, the Court was careful to note that “[i]f 911 operators are
not themselves law enforcement officers, they may at least be agents of law enforcement when they
conduct interrogations of 911 callers. For purposes of this opinion (and without deciding the point), we
consider their acts to be acts of the police.” Id. at 823 n.2.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 819-20.
56. Id. at 820.
57. Davis, 547 U.S. at 828 (quoting Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 457).
58. Id. at 829-30.
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examination.”59 Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Indiana.60
III. THE STATE OF “TESTIMONIAL” IN MAINE
The new Crawford framework represented a dramatic change in Confrontation
Clause analysis in Maine.61 In the wake of Crawford, Maine grappled, as did other
states, to fill the holes left in the Supreme Court’s decision. Recognizing that the
application of Crawford would “require detailed attention to the specific facts in
each case,”62 the Law Court’s first opportunity to apply Crawford arose in 2004 in
State v. Gorman.63 In a fairly straightforward application of Crawford, the Law
Court held that grand jury testimony was “testimonial” for the purposes of the
Confrontation Clause.64
Filling in the holes that would later be addressed by the Supreme Court in
Davis, the Law Court next addressed the contours of Crawford’s definition of
“testimonial” in State v. Barnes.65 Barnes was found guilty of murdering his
mother and appealed his conviction to the Law Court.66 The Law Court affirmed
his conviction, at which point Barnes filed a Motion for Reconsideration, asking
the Law Court to review the trial court’s admission into evidence of statements
made by his mother to a police officer shortly before her death.67 The jury heard a
police officer testify that Barnes’s mother had driven herself to a police station in a
state of distress, and that once inside the station, Barnes’s mother told officers that
her son had assaulted her and threatened to kill her.68 Foreshadowing the Supreme
Court’s holding in Davis, the Law Court held that the trial court did not commit
error with its admission of Barnes’s mother’s statements because her statements
were not “testimonial.”69 The Law Court reasoned that her statements were not
given during a “police interrogation” because they were made when Barnes’s
mother was “still under the stress of the alleged assault” and “seeking safety and
aid.”70
Shortly after the Supreme Court issued its holding in Davis, the Law Court
issued a very brief opinion in the case of State v. Bennett.71 Bennett was convicted
by a jury of elevated aggravated assault, robbery, and unauthorized use of
property.72 At trial, the judge had permitted the jury to hear a recording of the
victim’s 911 call, made just after he was brutally attacked by Bennett.73 Without
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 830.
Id. at 834.
See Morin, 598 A.2d at 172.
State v. Barnes, 2004 ME 105, ¶ 10, 854 A.2d 208, 212.
2004 ME 90, 854 A.2d 1164.
Id. ¶ 55, 854 A.2d at 1178.
2004 ME 105, 854 A.2d 208.
Id. ¶ 1, 854 A.2d at 209.
Id. ¶¶ 3-4, 854 A.2d at 209 (admitted under the excited utterance hearsay exception).
Id. ¶ 3, 854 A.2d at 209.
Id. ¶ 11, 854 A.2d at 211-12.
Id.
2006 ME 103, 903 A.2d 853.
Id. ¶ 1, 903 A.2d at 854.
Id. ¶ 8, 903 A.2d at 855.
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spelling out its own reasoning, the Law Court simply cited Davis and held that
“admitting the tape did not violate the Confrontation Clause.”74
The Law Court held in State v. Ahmed that a trial court did not commit error by
admitting, for the purposes of evaluating credibility, a domestic violence victim’s
statements made during a 911 call.75 The Law Court hinted with a footnote that
although the victim refused to testify at trial, Ahmed’s rights under the
Confrontation Clause would not have been violated because the 911 call was made
“for the purpose of resolving a present emergency,” and therefore, per Davis, was
not testimonial.76
In State v. Roberts, the Law Court held that admission of evidence that would
otherwise be “testimonial” did not implicate the Confrontation Clause if the
evidence was not offered for substantive purposes.77 Roberts was found guilty of
murdering the mother of his child78 and appealed on the grounds that his rights
under the Confrontation Clause had been violated by the admission into evidence
of a complaint for protection from abuse and a supporting affidavit that had been
filed by the victim prior to her death.79 The court was not persuaded by Roberts’s
argument because the jury was properly instructed not to use the allegations
contained in the order or affidavit for substantive purposes.80
Finally, in 2008, the Law Court held in State v. Tayman that a public record,
proof of notice of license suspension generated by the Department of Motor
Vehicles, was not “testimonial” for the purposes of the Confrontation Clause.81
The Law Court was persuaded that “the Crawford Court’s exclusion of business
records from the definition of ‘testimonial’ provided a basis to conclude that public
records were similarly not within the purview of Confrontation Clause analysis.”82
The Law Court included in its holding public records that “merely reflect the
routine cataloging of administrative events” and that “do not contain assertions or
accusations made after the fact and in preparation for litigation,” which are not
testimonial.83
IV. MAINE LEADS THE WAY: STATE V. MANGOS
Although the “testimonial” nature of forensic laboratory reports has been “the
most widespread subject of controversy” in the wake of Crawford,84 the Supreme
74. Id. ¶ 9, 903 A.2d at 856.
75. 2006 ME 133, ¶¶ 12-15, 909 A.2d 1011, 1016-17.
76. Id. at n.1 (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 826-27).
77. 2008 ME 112, ¶ 34, 951 A.2d 803, 814.
78. Id. ¶¶ 1-18, 951 A.2d at 806-10.
79. Id. ¶ 33, 951 A.2d at 813.
80. Id. ¶¶ 33-34, 951 A.2d at 813-14. The trial court told the jury not to “consider the allegations
that appear in the 2005 complaint as evidence of anything. They’re simply allegations.” Id. ¶ 33, 951
A.2d at 813.
81. 2008 ME 177, ¶¶ 24-25, 960 A.2d 1151, 1158.
82. Id. ¶ 18, 960 A.2d at 1156. The court also looked to other state court decisions to reach its
decision. Id. ¶¶ 15-17, 960 A.2d at 1156 (citing State v. Shipley, 757 N.W.2d 228 (Iowa 2008); State v.
Kronich 161 P.3d 982 (Wash. 2007); State v. Kirkpatrick, 161 P.3d 990 (Wash. 2007)).
83. Id. ¶ 21, 960 A.2d at 1157 (emphasis added).
84. Brief of Amici Curiae Professors Paul C. Giannelli et al. in Support of Petioner at 1, Campbell
v. North Dakota, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1180, (No. 05-564).
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Court has not yet resolved the issue. The Law Court, in State v. Mangos,85
answered this question and held that laboratory reports were testimonial.
In 2006, Vincent Mangos was convicted of robbing a convenience store in
Lewiston, Maine.86 At trial, the prosecution offered into evidence a laboratory
report, prepared by the Maine State Police Laboratory, that used DNA testing to
link Mangos to clothing found near the crime scene.87 In order to establish the
chain of custody, the prosecution called a laboratory supervisor to testify, based on
the report of a laboratory technician who handled the clothing, about the process of
taking swabs from the garments.88 Over Mangos’s objection, the laboratory
supervisor testified in lieu of the laboratory technician.89 The supervisor admitted
that, because she had not performed the swabbing and only had the laboratory
technician’s report to speak from, “only [the laboratory technician] could testify as
to whether the correct scientific method was used in creating the swabs.”90
After being convicted of robbery, Mangos appealed to the Law Court.91 He
argued that because the laboratory technician’s report was used to “establish both
the factual and scientific foundation for the admission of the DNA evidence,” the
technician was a “witness against him,” and he therefore had a right to crossexamine her under the Confrontation Clause.92 Underestimating the strength of
Mangos’s argument, the State argued simply that because the laboratory technician
did not testify at trial, her report was not “testimonial,” and that the defendant’s
right to confront was not violated because the technician’s actual report was not
admitted into evidence, 93 without considering the fact that the laboratory
supervisor’s testimony was based on the laboratory technician’s report.94
The Law Court was persuaded by Mangos’s argument and vacated his
conviction.95 The court held that the laboratory technician’s statements contained
in her report were testimonial and therefore subject to the Confrontation Clause.96
Citing Davis for the proposition that “[t]estimonial evidence includes statements
made for the purpose of police investigation,” the court concluded that the
technician’s statements were exactly that.97 Accordingly, Mangos had a right to
cross-examine her.98 In holding that the trial court’s error was not harmless, the
Law Court was mindful of the fact that DNA “is very powerful evidence,” and is

85. 2008 ME 150, 957 A.2d 89.
86. Id. ¶ 1, 957 A.2d at 90-91.
87. Id. ¶¶ 4-5, 957 A.2d at 91-92.
88. Id. ¶ 4, 957 A.2d at 91.
89. Id.
90. Id. ¶ 6, 957 A.2d at 92.
91. Mangos, 2008 ME 150, ¶ 1, 957 A.2d at 90-91.
92. Brief for Appellant at 9-10, State v. Mangos, 2008 ME 150, 957 A.2d 89 (No. And-07-602)
(emphasis added).
93. Brief for the State, Appellee at 11, State v. Mangos, 2008 ME 150, 957 A.2d 89 (No. And-07602).
94. Mangos, 2008 ME 150, ¶ 4, 957 A.2d at 91.
95. Id. ¶ 1, 957 A.2d at 91.
96. Id. ¶ 13, 957 A.2d at 93.
97. Id. ¶¶ 11,13, 957 A.2d at 93 (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 830).
98. Id. ¶ 13, 957 A.2d at 93.
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therefore likely to have a profound impact on the jury.99
Implicit in the court’s holding in Mangos is the conclusion that laboratory
reports are not subject to the public records exception cited in Tayman. The critical
distinction between the statements made in each case is the time at which the
statements were made. “Assertions” made “in preparation for litigation” do not fall
within the business or public record exception and are therefore subject to the
Confrontation Clause. 100 As the Crawford Court explained, those statements that
fall under the common law business record exception “by their nature [are] not
testimonial.”101 Although the report in question in Mangos contained statements
about the preparation of the swabs to be tested, the Mangos holding is broad and
therefore applies similarly to the statements made “in preparation for litigation”
contained in the report of a laboratory technician who actually conducted the
testing and interpreted the results.102 Such statements would also fall into the
purview of Mangos as being “in furtherance of a police investigation.” The court’s
holding in Mangos is uncharted territory in Maine, as evidenced by the court’s
noticeable absence of supporting authority.
The Law Court did not address how its holding in Mangos would interact with
Maine’s statutes permitting admission of lab evidence via affidavit, 103 subject to a
defendant’s request that a technician testify as to the contents of the affidavit.
Namely, section 2431 of title 29-A permits admission into evidence of the contents
of duly signed and sworn certificates, prepared by analysts, stating the results of
blood-alcohol or drug concentration analysis.104 Section 2431 also includes a
“notice-and-demand” caveat, which provides that a defendant “may request that a
qualified witness testify to the matters of which the certificate constitutes prima
facie evidence.”105 The statute does not demand that the witness be the person who
actually conducted the test, mirroring the very procedure that the Law Court
rejected in Mangos. Similarly, section 1112 of title 17-A provides that, after
analyzing “a drug or substance from a law enforcement officer,” a laboratory “shall
issue a certificate stating the results of the analysis.”106 The duly signed and sworn
certificate “is admissible in evidence” and “gives rise to a permissible inference . . .
that the composition, quality and quantity of the drug or substance are as stated in
the certificate.”107 However, the certificate is not automatically admissible unless
“the defendant requests that a qualified witness testify as to the composition,

99. Id. ¶¶ 14-15, 957 A.2d at 93-94. See also Jeffrey Toobin, The CSI Effect: The Truth About
Forensic Science, THE NEW YORKER, May 7, 2007, at 30 (“In large part because of the [television]
series’ success . . . [the] profession has acquired an air of glamour, and its practitioners an aura of
infallibility.”).
100. 2008 ME 177, ¶ 21, 960 A.2d at 1157.
101. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56.
102. This interpretation of the Law Court’s holding is further evidenced by the fact that Maine did
not join the thirty-six states writing as amici curiae in support of Massachusetts. See Brief of the States,
supra note 8.
103. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, § 2431 (1996 & Supp. 2008-2009).
104. Id.
105. Id. § 2431(2)(D) (emphasis added).
106. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1112(1) (2006).
107. Id.
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quality and quantity.”108 After Mangos, the definition of a “qualified” witness must
necessarily be narrowed to include only the laboratory technician who performed
the analysis.
The Mangos opinion is sparse and leaves questions unanswered. This is likely
because the Law Court knew that the United States Supreme Court had granted
certiorari on the same issue in the case of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.109
Because the Mangos holding is consistent with historical and Supreme Court
precedent, as expounded on by Melendez-Diaz and his amicus curiae in their briefs,
the Supreme Court should follow the Law Court’s reasoning.
V. FOLLOWING MAINE’S LEAD: MELENDEZ-DIAZ V. MASSACHUSETTS
The question now before the Supreme Court in Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts is “[w]hether a state forensic analyst’s laboratory report prepared for
use in a criminal prosecution is ‘testimonial’ evidence subject to the demands of
the Confrontation Clause as set forth in Crawford v. Washington.”110 The
petitioner, Luis Melendez-Diaz, was arrested in Massachusetts in 2001 on
suspicion of drug dealing and was later charged with distributing and trafficking in
cocaine.111 At trial, the prosecution offered, pursuant to Chapter 111, Section 13 of
the General Laws of Massachusetts,112 certificates of laboratory reports reflecting
the results of testing performed at the behest of the police department on the
substances contained in plastic bags seized from a man with the petitioner and
found in the back seat of the police cruiser in which the petitioner had been
transported.113 The petitioner objected to the admission of the certificates absent an
opportunity to cross-examine the analysts who prepared them, but the trial court
overruled his objections.114 After being instructed that it was “permitted but . . .

108. Id.
109. Melendez-Diaz, 128 S.Ct. 1647 (2008).
110. Brief for Petitioner at i, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009) (No. 07-591)
[hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
111. Id. at 5-7.
112. Chapter 111, section 13 of the General Laws of Massachusetts, similar to Maine’s section 1112,
provides:
The analyst or an assistant analyst of the department [of public health] . . . shall upon
request furnish a signed certificate, on oath, of the result of the analysis provided for in
the preceding section to any police officer or any agent of such incorporated charitable
organization, and the presentation of such certificate to the court by any police officer or
agent of any such organization shall be prima facie evidence that all the requirements
and provisions of the preceding section have been complied with. This certificate shall
be sworn to before a justice of the peace or notary public, and the jurat shall contain a
statement that the subscriber is the analyst or an assistant analyst of the department.
When properly executed, it shall be prima facie evidence of the composition, quality,
and net weight of the narcotic or other drug, poison, medicine, or chemical analyzed or
the net weight of any mixture containing the narcotic or other drug, poison, medicine, or
chemical analyzed, and the court shall take judicial notice of the signature of the analyst
or assistant analyst, and of the fact that he is such.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 13 (2003).
113. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 110, at 8.
114. Id.
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not required to conclude that the substance was cocaine,”115 the jury found the
petitioner guilty and he was sentenced to three years in prison.116
The Appeals Court of Massachusetts affirmed the petitioner’s conviction.117
The appeals court cited the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's prior holding
in Commonwealth v. Verde that introducing “certificates of drug analysis” in lieu of
live testimony does not “deny a defendant the right of confrontation.”118 In Verde,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded that drug analysis certificates
“had very little kinship to the type of hearsay the confrontation clause intended to
exclude, absent an opportunity for cross-examination.”119 The Verde Court
reasoned that drug analysis certificates “are neither discretionary nor based on
opinion”120 and therefore were “akin to a business or official record, which the
Court [in Crawford] stated was not testimonial in nature.”121 Melendez-Diaz then
petitioned for, and was granted, a Writ of Certiorari by the United States Supreme
Court.122
Consistent with the Law Court’s holding in Mangos, Petitioner Melendez-Diaz
contends that forensic laboratory reports are “testimonial” under Crawford, and to
an even greater extent under Davis, and therefore are subject to the Confrontation
Clause. As the petitioner explains, “[A] classic form of testimonial hearsay is an ex
parte affidavit, . . . and modern forensic laboratory certificates are the functional
equivalent of such affidavits.”123 Because forensic reports “are expressly prepared
for law enforcement to aid in criminal investigations . . . [they] are fundamentally
testimonial in a way that classic business and official records were not.”124 The
petitioner explains that the “common-law shop-book” [or business] exception and
the “common-law hearsay exception for official (or public) records,” as envisioned
by the Founders, was much narrower than Massachusetts would have it be,125 and
“did not remotely encompass reports generated for use in investigations or
litigation.”126 Indeed, were ex parte statements made in preparation for litigation
excepted under the business or public records exception, the Confrontation Clause
would be practically rendered moot. As the Court extrapolated in Crawford, such
statements were precisely what the Confrontation Clause was designed to protect

115. Id. at 9 n.2.
116. Id. at 8-9.
117. Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, 2007 WL 2189152, at *5 (Mass. App. Ct. July 31, 2007).
118. Id. at *4 n.3 (citing Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701, 704-05 (Mass. 2005)).
119. Verde, 827 N.E.2d at 706.
120. Id. at 705.
121. Id. at 706 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56).
122. Melendez-Diaz, 128 S. Ct. 1647.
123. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 110, at 4.
124. Id. at 11-12.
125. Id. at 20-21. In response, Massachusetts contends that “drug analysis certificates are well within
the common law definition official records exception because they are prepared by state officials
pursuant to a duty imposed by law.” Brief for Respondent at 11, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129
S. Ct. 2527 (2009) (No. 07-591) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent].
126. Id. at 20. See also Brief of Richard D. Friedman, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at
13-14, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009) (No. 07-591) [hereinafter Friedman
Brief] citing Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 114 (1943)) (“If a document is prepared for litigation, it
is testimonial in nature whether or not the state chooses to label it a business or official record.”).
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against.127
In defense of the appeals court’s decision, Massachusetts contends that, more
than the Crawford Court’s focus on “testimonial” statements, the primary focus of
the Confrontation Clause is on “accusatory” statements.128 Under that analysis,
because laboratory reports “reflect only . . . objective or neutral facts”129 they do
not “implicate the ‘principle evil’ the Confrontation Clause was designed to
avoid.”130 As the petitioner counters, however, “the Commonwealth’s ‘directly
accusatory’ rule is startlingly restrictive,”131 and has no basis in either the text of
the Sixth Amendment or in precedent. Indeed, the petitioner goes on, “the phrase
‘witnesses against’ is broader than the word ‘accusers,’132 and “[m]any criminal
prosecutions rest entirely on circumstantial evidence, none of which ‘directly
accuse[s] anyone of any criminal conduct.’”133
Whether or not lab technicians are in fact law enforcement personnel, as Davis
would suggest that they are,134 they conduct tests at the behest of, and at the
expense of, the prosecution. Further, laboratory technicians are unquestionably
human. Massachusetts contends that “the primary source of the statement is not
even the analyst, but the machine itself.”135 This argument perpetuates a “myth of
infallibility—a myth that finds no basis in the reality of state forensic practices
throughout the country.”136 The Commonwealth’s argument is a fallacy and
demonstrates a willful disregard of the human involvement that is essential to
forensic testing. Laboratory reports are prepared by humans and “reflect
complicated, subjective interpretations of imprecise scientific tests.”137
Additionally, as illustrated in Mangos, laboratory reports contain technicians’
accounting of the means in which samples for testing were procured and prepared.
The inescapable human element of laboratory testing necessarily means that
laboratory reports are fallible. The ability to confront laboratory technician
witnesses is even more essential in light of the statistics provided by the National
127. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-51.
128. Brief for Respondent, supra note 125, at 10. The respondent further contends that although it
does not have case law to support this contention, “[t]he Sixth Amendment’s text itself supports an
accusation-based focus.” Id. at 18.
129. Id. at 23.
130. Id. at 11 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50).
131. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 3, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009) (No.
07-591).
132. Id. at 4.
133. Id. at 3 (quoting Brief of Respondent, supra note 125, at 16-17). See also Friedman Brief, supra
note 126, at 16 (“An eyewitness who is asked to do nothing more than relate what she saw is the
paradigmatic example of a witness subject to the Clause.”).
134. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 827 (noting the difference between efforts designed to establish a past
fact and efforts to determine current circumstances requiring police assistance).
135. Brief for Respondent, supra note 125, at 30. Writing as amicus curiae, the United States asserts
that “[t]esting results that contain no human assertion are not ‘statements’ at all, and therefore cannot be
‘testimonial statements’ for Confrontation Clause purposes.” Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondent, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009) (No. 07-591)
[hereinafter Brief of the United States].
136. Brief of Amicus Curiae the National Innocence Network in Support of Petitioner at 4,
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009) (No. 07-591) [hereinafter Brief of National
Innocence Network].
137. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 110, at 12.
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Innocence Network writing as amicus curiae for the petitioner. Having discovered
“over [100] exonerations [wherein] the misapplication of forensic disciplines . . .
played a role in convicting the innocent,”138 the National Innocence Project posits
that “state forensic examiners do exercise substantial discretion and judgment . . .
and these examiners also often interpret the results of unverified techniques for
which there often exists no recognized or objective standard at all.”139 Hence,
“[t]he fact that these sorts of forensic practices exist stands as a glaring example of
the sort of failing that confrontation is designed to prevent and expose.”140 The
National Innocence Project’s conclusions are supported by a 2008 report conducted
by the National Academy of Science, which found that:
Forensic evidence that has helped convict thousands of defendants for nearly a
century is often the product of shoddy scientific practices that should be upgraded
and standardized . . . [and] the field suffer[s] from a reliance on outmoded and
untested theories by analysts who often have no background in science, statistics
141
or other empirical disciplines.

Asserting that laboratory reports are not testimonial, only report objective
facts, and fall under the business records exception, Massachusetts contends that
they are sufficiently “reliable” to render cross-examination of the individual who
prepared the report unnecessary.142 As the petitioner explains, “[T]hese three
arguments are just different ways of asserting that forensic reports should be
deemed nontestimonial because they are reliable.”143 However, the “reliability”
standard was expressly rejected in Roberts. Furthermore, as demonstrated by the
National Innocence Project and the recent report conducted by the National
Academy of Science, state laboratory forensic tests results are anything but
reliable.
It is certainly true that, were the Supreme Court to follow in the Law Court’s
footsteps in classifying forensic laboratory reports as “testimonial” and, therefore,
subject to the Confrontation Clause, the administrative burden placed on states in
prosecuting many criminal cases would be increased.144 However, “[w]hile the
138. Brief of National Innocence Network, supra note 136, at 2-3. “These are just some of the many
exoneration cases that illustrate how forensic laboratory errors and overreaching plagued the criminal
justice process during the past 35 years.” Id. at 20. See also Houston Won’t Review Cases in Lab
Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 14, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/14/us/14
houston.html?emc=eta1 (reporting on the discovery of “hundreds of criminal cases believed tainted by
problems in the [Houston] Police Department’s crime laboratory”).
139. Brief of National Innocence Network, supra note 136, at 4-5.
140. Id. at 17.
141. Solomon Moore, Science Found Wanting in Nation’s Crime Labs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2009, at
A1.
142. See Brief of Respondent, supra note 125, 14, 23, 30.
143. Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 131, at 8.
144. In its brief in support of the respondent, the National District Attorneys Association (NDAA)
and District, Prosecuting, and County Attorneys argue that “[g]iven the limited resources in the state
laboratories, requiring live testimony in each and every drug-related case would cause significant delays
in the administration of justice.” Brief of Amici Curiae the National District Attorneys Association et
al. at 15, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009) (No. 07-591) [hereinafter Brief of
National District Attorneys Association]. The NDAA posited that “[i]f live testimony of an analyst
were required in each and every drug case, the current criminal justice system would effectively come to
a standstill.” Id. at 19.
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State’s administrative and fiscal concerns are legitimate, they cannot control the
scope of the ‘bedrock procedural guarantee’” of the Confrontation Clause.145
Indeed, “[t]he criminal justice system would, no doubt, be cheaper and more
efficient . . . if the confrontation right did not exist. So too would it be cheaper and
more efficient if it did without juries, or lawyers, or even judges.”146 Holding
forensic laboratory results to be “testimonial” would likely have the effect of
rendering the results more reliable as “examiners who realize there is a possibility
their work—or lack thereof—will be subjected to adversarial scrutiny can be
expected to think twice before making up results and tests from scratch.”147 Were
that the case, “[g]ood forensic practices [would] have nothing to fear in such a
system. Not only [would] such procedures and methods withstand even the most
vigorous cross-examination, but the accused [would] often choose to forego
confrontation entirely, rather than drive home in front of the fact-finder the
accuracy and reliability of the scientific evidence against him,”148 thereby lessening
the administrative burden.
The development of forensic testing has made the task of prosecuting
defendants easier for prosecutors by providing them with a means of connecting the
defendant to the crime scene or verifying the chemical composition of illicit
substances found in the possession or bloodstream of a defendant. With the
development of the forensic technologies that aid them in their prosecutions of
criminals, the states must also bear the burden of protecting criminal defendants
from abuse of the same. However, as Richard D. Friedman, writing as amicus
curiae for the petitioner acknowledges, Melendez-Diaz presents “an easy case . . .
[b]ut . . . sometimes ‘easy cases make bad law.’”149 There is no sense in
unnecessarily consuming the states’ resources by providing a live witness to
present the results of forensic laboratory testing, even where the defendant does not
challenge the results or feel he has anything to gain by cross-examining their
preparer.150 Because “[c]onfrontation rights, like many other constitutional rights,
can be waived,”151 defendants’ rights under the Confrontation Clause would be
satisfied by “notice and demand” statutes that provide for confrontation of the
laboratory technician or technicians who performed the forensic laboratory test by
requiring “prosecutors [to] present live testimony from forensic examiners only in
cases in which criminal defendants affirmatively choose to exercise their
confrontation rights.”152
145. Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 6, Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009) (No. 07-591) [hereinafter Brief of Law Professors] (quoting
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42).
146. Friedman Brief, supra note 126, at 18-19.
147. Brief of National Innocence Network, supra note 136, at 17.
148. Id. at 31.
149. Friedman Brief, supra note 126, at 2 (quoting O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S.
773, 804 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
150. “For defendants, absent a specific basis in fact for contesting the correctness of an expert’s
conclusion, there is little to gain and much to lose in requiring an articulate, well-credentialed expert to
appear to prove an undisputed technical detail of an alleged crime.” Brief of Law Professors, supra note
145, at 11.
151. Id. at 9 (citing Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966)).
152. Id. at 14-15.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Law Court was correct in holding that forensic laboratory reports are
testimonial and, therefore, subject to the Confrontation Clause in State v. Mangos.
In light of the historical purpose of the Clause and of its own Confrontation Clause
precedent, the Supreme Court should classify laboratory reports prepared in
anticipation of litigation as “testimonial” in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts. The
procedural protections provided by the Confrontation Clause are essential to the
integrity of our adversarial system. Laboratory reports are critical to prosecutors’
cases against criminal defendants and are damning evidence in the eyes of juries.
Preventing defendants from cross-examining the preparers of such evidence
deprives criminal defendants of their constitutional rights, and the Supreme Court
is now in a position to remedy the same.
VII. ADDENDUM
Consistent with this Note’s reasoning, but imposing important limitations not
considered by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court in State v. Mangos, the majority
opinion in Melendez-Diaz, written by Justice Scalia and joined by Justices Stevens,
Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, posited that this “case involves little more than the
application of our holding in Crawford v. Washington.”153 Relying on the Davis
Court’s definition of “testimonial” statements, which included affidavits, the Court
explained that the “documents at issue [in Melendez-Diaz], while denominated by
Massachusetts law ‘certificates,’ are quite plainly affidavits: ‘declaration[s] of facts
written down and sworn to by the declarant before an officer authorized to
administer oaths.’”154 Again, harkening back to Davis, the Court elaborated that
“the ‘certificates’ are functionally identical to live, in-court testimony, doing
‘precisely what a witness does on direct examination.’” 155
The Court rejected Massachusetts’s argument that a witness’s statements must
be “accusatory” in order to be subject to the Confrontation Clause by relying on the
text of the Amendment, which simply guarantees a defendant’s right of
confrontation of witnesses “against him.”156 Citing the National Academy Report,
the Court also rejected the contention that laboratory test results are always the
result of “neutral scientific testing.”157 The Court correctly identified the fact that
the argument that laboratory test results are sufficiently reliable so as to not require
confrontation “is little more than an invitation to return to [the Court’s] overruled
decision in Roberts ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.’”158 Finally, with
regard to Massachusetts’s contention that laboratory test results are “business
records” and therefore are subject to the traditional exception to confrontation
afforded such documents, the Court explained that Massachusetts “misunderstands
the relationship” between the hearsay exception for business records and the

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2542.
Id. at 2532 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 62 (8th ed. 2004))
Id. (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 830).
Id. at 2533.
Id. at 2536 (quotation marks omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
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Confrontation Clause.159 The Court further noted that whether or not laboratory
results are created in the course of conducting business, they are also created for
“the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial,” and are therefore
testimonial.160
The divide between the majority and dissenting opinions is essentially that of
the formalists versus the pragmatists. Because of its concerns about the practical
ramifications of the majority’s opinion, the dissent offered strained arguments to
arrive at its ultimate goal of excluding laboratory test results from the requirements
of the Confrontation Clause.161 In an attempt to reach its desired outcome, the
dissent essentially took issue with the Court’s precedent in Crawford, namely with
the Court’s formulation of the category of out-of-court statements—those that are
“testimonial”—that are subject to the Confrontation Clause.162 Despite the
dissent’s distaste for what it viewed as the majority’s unsupported classification of
“testimonial” statements, the dissent offered little support for its own formulation
that the Confrontation Clause applies instead only to “conventional” witnesses.
The dissent defined a “conventional” witness as “one who has personal knowledge
of some aspect of the defendant’s guilt” and “one who perceived an event that gave
rise to a personal belief in some aspect of the defendant’s guilt.”163 For the
contention that the right to confront is limited to “conventional” witnesses,
however, there is no support to be found in the text of the Confrontation Clause,
which reads quite plainly that all witnesses against the defendant are subject to
confrontation.
The dissent was concerned that the majority’s holding “imposes enormous
costs on the administration of justice” and “threatens to disrupt forensic
investigations across the country and to put prosecutions nationwide at risk of
dismissal based on erratic, all-too-frequent instances when a particular laboratory
technician, now invested by the Court’s new constitutional designation as the
analyst, simply does not or cannot appear.”164 The dissent is not alone in its handwringing about the majority’s holding.165 Holding steadfast to its understanding of
the Constitutional guarantee, however, the majority maintained that “[t]he
Confrontation Clause may make the prosecution of criminals more burdensome,
but that is equally true of the right to trial by jury and the privilege against selfincrimination. The Confrontation Clause—like those other constitutional
provisions—is binding, and we may not disregard it at our convenience.”166
Further, the majority “doubt[ed] the accuracy of respondent’s and the dissent’s dire
predictions.”167 Minimizing the dissent’s concerns, the majority offered that
159. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2539.
160. Id. at 2540.
161. Id. at 2558 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 2551-52.
163. Id. at 2543.
164. Id. at 2549.
165. See Tom Jackman, Lab Analyst Decision Complicates Prosecutions; High Court Requires
Scientists to Testify, WASH. POST, July 15, 2009, at A1 (noting the concerns of prosecutors). See also
Adam Liptak, Justices Rule Crime Analysts Must Testify on Lab Results, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2009, at
A1.
166. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2540.
167. Id.
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“[p]erhaps the best indication that the sky will not fall after today’s decision is that
it has not done so already.”168 In support of its position, the majority noted the ten
states that had already adopted the constitutional rule announced in Melendez-Diaz
and found that there was “no evidence that the criminal justice system has ground
to a halt.”169 Of the ten states cited by the majority, Maine was not among them.170
This is perhaps an expression by the Court that, in its estimation, the Maine Law
Court’s holding in Mangos is overbroad.
Although the dissent failed to offer a compelling justification for its conclusion
that laboratory test results prepared by analysts are not subject to the Confrontation
Clause, the dissent did identify an issue raised by Mangos: Who is the analyst?171
As illustrated by Mangos, the Melendez-Diaz dissent pointed out that there are
several people involved with the preparation and testing of a sample and that each
could be considered an analyst under the majority’s analysis.172 As the dissent
explained, each of the individuals involved with the testing “has power to introduce
error.”173 Along those same lines, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court held in
Mangos that the individual who prepared the sample, like the individual who
conducted the testing, was subject to confrontation.174 The Melendez-Diaz majority
dismissed the dissent’s argument with the following reasoning:
Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion . . . we do not hold, and it is not the case, that
anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing the chain of custody,
authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person
as part of the prosecution’s case. . . . It is up to the prosecution to decide what
steps in the chain of custody are so crucial as to require evidence; but what
175
testimony is introduced must (if the defendant objects) be introduced live.

In responding to the dissent’s fears that Melendez-Diaz would create a
“slippery slope” requiring the appearance of each and every laboratory employee
involved at any stage of the testing process, the majority made a shrewd distinction,
one not made by the Law Court in Mangos and one that should appease the
pragmatic concerns of the dissent and catastrophizing commentators alike. The
Melendez-Diaz majority explained, of those involved in the preparation and testing,
only one person provides “testimony” subject to the Confrontation Clause, the
individual who actually conducts the test which produces the result that is to be
introduced in court.176
VIII. LOOKING AHEAD
The disagreement about Melendez-Diaz’s practical implications and the
uncertainty about the reach of the Supreme Court’s opinion may be short lived,
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id.
Id. at 2540-41.
Id. at 2540-41 n.11.
Id. at 2544 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2544 at (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2545.
See Mangos, 2008 ME 150, ¶¶ 8, 13, 957 A.2d at 92-93.
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 n.1 (emphasis added).
Id. at 2532 & n.1.
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however, in light of the Court’s grant of certiorari, subsequent to its issuance of
Melendez-Diaz, in the case of Briscoe v. Virginia.177 Briscoe presents the
following question:
If a state allows a prosecutor to introduce a certificate of a forensic laboratory
analysis, without presenting the testimony of the analyst who prepared the
certificate, does the state avoid violating the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment by providing that the accused has a right to call the analyst as his own
178
witness?

This question would appear to have been answered by Melendez-Diaz. Indeed,
the Court specifically explained that “[c]onverting the prosecution’s duty under the
Confrontation Clause into the defendant’s privilege under state law or the
Compulsory Process Clause shifts the consequences of adverse-witness no-shows
from the State to the accused.”179 “More fundamentally,” the Court continued, “the
Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on the prosecution to present its witnesses,
not on the defendant to bring those adverse witnesses into court.”180 As University
of Michigan Law School Professor Richard D. Friedman, a Confrontation Clause
scholar and the attorney who filed the petition for certiorari in Briscoe, reacted to
the Court’s opinion in Melendez-Diaz on his blog:
[There is also the] argument that the power to subpoena the analyst, either under
the Compulsory Process Clause or a state statute, adequately fulfills the
confrontation right. Justice Scalia gives this argument the back of the hand that it
deserves, dismissing it in a single paragraph–though several states had adopted it.
And it was dangerous, too, because the principle was limitless and would have
posed a significant threat to the continuing vitality of the Confrontation Clause. I
confess I was a little sorry to see this part of the opinion; my petition in Briscoe v.
Virginia, which has been held pending this decision, had raised this issue, and I
would have loved to argue it. Instead, we get handed a victory without argument.
181
Darn.

Although Professor Friedman felt that Melendez-Diaz was “the right result, for
the right reasons,” he expressed his disappointment at what he perceived to be the
Court’s foreclosure of the issue presented in his case.182 Apparently, though, the
Supreme Court of the United States read the situation differently.
One can only speculate about the Court’s reasoning for granting certiorari on
an issue within a week of issuing an opinion that appears to have resolved that very
issue. What is certain, however, is that Justice Sotomayor, instead of Justice
Souter, will be a new voice on the Court in Briscoe. This personnel change has the
potential to have a tremendous impact on the Court’s Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence. As Marquette University Law School Professor Daniel D. Blinka
explained:
177. 129 S. Ct. 2858 (2009).
178. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Briscoe v. Virginia, petition for cert. filed, No. 07-11191
(May 28, 2009).
179. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2540.
180. Id.
181. The Confrontation Blog, http://confrontationright.blogspot.com (June 25, 2009, 20:05 EDT).
182. Id.
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Melendez-Diaz itself may have a short shelf-life. Only four days after publishing
Melendez-Diaz, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a Virginia case that
revisits this very evidentiary scenario. Since the recently departed David Souter
provided the fifth vote for the majority, we will soon learn how justice-soon-to-be
183
Sotomayor, a former prosecutor with a liberal bent, affects the balance.

There is much conjecture about Sotomayor’s ideology and personal history,
and the impact that both might have on the Court. The Wall Street Journal
predicted that “[w]hile Judge Sonia Sotomayor stands in the liberal mainstream on
many issues, her record suggests that the Supreme Court nominee could sometimes
rule with the top court's conservatives on questions of criminal justice.”184
Commentator Lyle Dennison deemed that:
There is, it would seem, at least a chance that [Souter’s] designated successor,
Judge Sotomayor, would not be prepared to embrace Melendez-Diaz, at least
without some restriction on its scope; she has a record on criminal law issues that
appears to be somewhat more prosecution-oriented than Justice Souter’s has
185
been.

Similarly, Case Western Reserve University School of Law Professor Jonathan
Adler blogged that:
[T]here are reasons to suspect that she may join the pragmatists more often than
the formalists. For one thing, her criminal law opinions provide little evidence of
a strong civil libertarian streak of the sort that would lead her to apply
constitutional protections for criminal defendants in a strict and unyielding
manner. Further, her experience as a trial court judge and prosecutor may lead her
to take a more pragmatic, and less bright-line-oriented approach to these sorts of
cases. If so, her ascension to the Court could have dramatic consequences for
criminal law, as she could create a new Court majority on these issues and roll
back recent decisions on the Confrontation Clause, sentencing rules, and other
186
areas of criminal law.

The impact that Judge Sotomayor and the Court’s decision in Briscoe will
have on Melendez-Diaz remains to be seen. At this point, the only certainty is that
there is uncertainty in the Court’s position on laboratory results and the
Confrontation Clause. As it stands now, however, Melendez-Diaz is, in the words
of Richard Friedman, “the right result for the right reason,”187 granting criminal
defendants the right to confront those individuals responsible for what amounts to
the “testimonial statement” of the results of laboratory testing.
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